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Abbreviations 
 
DDL - Deceased Donor Livers 
DDLT - Deceased Donor Liver Transplant/ation 
MELD - Model for End-Stage Liver Disease 
NCNR - Non-Citizen Non-Resident 
NCNRtx - Non-Citizen Non-Resident here solely for purposes of transplantation 
NRA - Non-Resident Alien 
NOTA - National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 
OPTN - Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network 
UNOS - United Network for Organ Sharing  
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Abstract 
The incidence of Non-Citizen Non-Resident patients coming to the United States specifically for 
deceased donor liver transplantation raises compelling ethical questions requiring careful consid-
eration.  The inclusion of these often financially and/or socially privileged patients in the pool of 
potential candidates for an absolutely scarce and life-saving liver transplant may exacerbate dis-
parities already existing in deceased donor liver allocation.  Additionally, their inclusion on or-
gan transplant waiting lists conflicts with recognized ethical principles of justice and reciprocity.   
Moreover, preliminary data suggest that public awareness of this practice could discourage organ 
donation thereby worsening an already profound supply-demand gulf.  Finally, United States or-
gan allocation policies and statutes are out of step with recently promulgated international trans-
plant guidelines which prioritize self-sufficiency of organ programs.  This article analyzes each 
of these ethical conflicts within the context of deceased donor liver transplantation and recom-
mends policy changes that align the United States with international practices that discourage 
this practice. 
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Introduction 
 
 The practice of providing organ transplant services to patients coming to the US solely 
for deceased donor liver transplantation raises intriguing and consequential ethical questions.  
Such patients would often otherwise lack access to transplantation services for reasons ranging 
from the poverty of their home country, to deeply-held cultural or religious beliefs regarding or-
gan donation.  The provision of care to these patients conforms to long-established US norms of 
international medical relief and accommodation of individual ethnic and religious practices.  At 
the same time, the supply of donor organs in the US, particularly deceased donor livers (DDL) is 
a mere fraction of that required to meet the needs of US residents awaiting transplantation raising 
ethical questions about the practice.  
 The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) has not ignored this trou-
bling dilemma.  In March of 2012, OPTN restructured its citizenship data classifications as part 
of an effort to better understand those patients coming to the US solely for purposes of transplan-
tation (1), hereafter NCNRtx patients.  To do this, OPTN created two new citizenship categories: 
“Non-Citizen Non-Residents, To US Not for Transplantation” and “Non-Citizen Non-Residents, 
To US for Transplantation” (1).   
 This reclassification was followed by the September 2012 revision to former OPTN Pol-
icy 6.0 (now Policy 17) on International Organ Transplantation.  Policy 17 removes the 5% au-
dit-trigger pertaining to organ transplants performed in patients who are neither citizens nor resi-
dents of the US (NCNRs) (2).  However, it requires transplant centers to report deceased-donor 
transplants performed in NCNRs, including NCNRtx patients (1, 2).   Although the data are 
scant, owing to the recent implementation of the policy revisions, the past two years (along with 
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examinations of the broader data regarding the prior classification of non resident alien patients) 
have revealed a small, generally socioeconomically advantaged group of individuals traveling to 
the US solely to obtain organ transplantation (3, 4, 5).   
This paper reexamines existing US transplantation policies and law pertaining specifi-
cally to the allocation of deceased donor liver transplantation (DDLT) to NCNRtx patients and 
identifies conflicts with both accepted ethical principles as well as recent international recom-
mendations.  The authors limit this discussion primarily to DDLT for three reasons: (1) among 
NCNR patients who received deceased donor transplantation in the US between 2013 and 2014 
(the first two years after the policy revisions), a significantly higher number were here for the 
sole purpose of obtaining a transplant (6); (2) a higher number and percentage of NCNRtx pa-
tients are waiting for DDLT than for other organs (7); and (3) at nearly 20% (8), the 2013 wait-
list mortality rate for DDLT candidates is the second highest of any organ wait-listed (9).  
DDLT, therefore, presents a picture of absolute scarcity of available deceased donor livers such 
that patients die waiting for organs.  Accordingly, while similarities undoubtedly exist across 
other organ transplant scenarios, an examination of NCNRtx patients seeking DDLT is particu-
larly important. 
In this paper, we argue for a last-in-line allocation of DDLT to NCNRtx patients prem-
ised on three important considerations.  First, the inclusion of NCNRtx patients in the pool of 
DDLT recipients may augment existing disparities within the US organ transplantation system.  
Second, ethical principles of reciprocity and justice are not adequately served by current policies 
and practices.  Third, practical considerations, including the potential consequences to the pub-
lic’s willingness to donate organs if it becomes aware of NCNRtx patients receiving life-saving 
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organs first, weigh against NCNRtx inclusion into the general recipient pool.  We will discuss 
each of these considerations in turn. 
Ethical Concerns Arising Out of Inclusion of NCNRs in Deceased Donor Liver Transplan-
tations 
Exacerbation of Existing Disparities 
 As of the end of May 2015, more than 15,000 individuals were waiting for liver trans-
plants in the US (10).  Approximately 200-400 individuals obtain living donor livers each year 
(11).  The remaining, an average of over 6000 per year over the past ten years, require DDLT 
(11).  Since 2006, there has been an overall gradual and consistent decrease in the rate of liver 
transplants performed (12).  OPTN attributes this to a worsening donor shortage (12), reflected at 
least in part by waiting times for adults, which have increased from an average of 12.9 months in 
2009 to 18.5 months in 2012 (12).    
 Despite the apparent and profound shortage, a small number of DDLs are allocated each 
year to NCNRtx patients.  Such patients do not obtain these livers in secret or by illegal means.  
In fact, many see OPTN Policy 17 as an attempt to increase transparency in the allocation of or-
gans to NCNR patients.  Moreover, existing US transplant policy and, arguably, Section 371 of 
the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (which specifies that medical criteria serve as the ba-
sis for organ allocation) (13), require that NCNRtx patients be allocated donor organs according 
to the same criteria as US residents.  However, NCNRtx patients appear more easily able to lev-
erage the unintentional inequities in the allocation infrastructure. 
 Specifically, an unfortunate reality of the US liver allocation system, and one which 
OPTN and transplant advocates have consistently attempted to remedy, is that patients with 
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means appear to have increased access to available donor livers.  For example, a recent examina-
tion of the interplay between geography and socioeconomic disparity in the context of DDLT in-
dicates that patients with financial means experience shorter waiting times and higher transplant 
rates likely secondary to the ability to Region-shop and travel (3, 5, 14).  After controlling for 
Medicaid status, patients who received transplants in Regions other than their home Region, had 
significantly higher median incomes than those who died on the wait list (14).  Most striking was 
a direct correlation between income and mortality, with patients having median incomes below 
$60,244 more likely to die on the wait list than those with incomes greater than that amount (14).   
Accordingly, NCNRtx patients enter a system of liver allocation that, albeit unintention-
ally, already favors patients with financial means.  Further, as noted both in the literature and an-
ecdotally within the transplant community, a portion of the formerly identified NRA transplant 
population are “highly affluent foreign nationals seeking top of the line care without economic 
barriers” (3, 4).  This is borne out by the sheer number of NRA patients who are self-pay: 38% 
compared to less than 1% of US citizens (3, 5). 
Additionally, not being confined by insurance network distinctions, NCNRtx patients en-
gage in Region-shopping, predominantly traveling to a small, strategic number of transplant cen-
ters for transplantation (7).  These patients either list in UNOS Regions with low list-to-trans-
plant wait times or list in multiple UNOS Regions, then travel to that Region with the first avail-
able liver (5, 7).  When combined with their relatively low list-to-transplant wait times (3, 5), 
low MELD scores (5), and likelihood of receiving exception points (3), it is apparent NCNRtx 
patients are able to benefit from unintentional existing inequities in the distribution of DDLT.   
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 Aggregate numbers of patients transplanted still favor US residents by a large margin.  
Still, the possibility that NCNRtx patients receive organs while corresponding US residents die 
raises significant ethical questions that deserve further careful reflection. 
Justice 
 Justice is demonstrated through avoidance of the allocative inequity and unfairness that 
can result from factors outside the patient’s direct control.  Historically, the algorithm used to al-
locate livers led to serious disparities in wait times and consequently, mortality for reasons that 
were largely coincidental to where the patient happened to reside.  Attempts to ameliorate such 
inequities were most recently made through the OPTN implementation of the Share-35 policy in 
2013.  This policy was promulgated with the intent of narrowing the disparity in MELD scores at 
time of transplantation among Regions (15).  Under this new allocation system, DDLs are of-
fered first Regionally to individuals with a MELD score greater than 35, regardless of that pa-
tient’s local service area, and are only offered locally if there is no Regional match whose MELD 
score is greater than 35 (15).  While Share-35 addresses part of the discrepancy between Re-
gional outcomes, it fails to address the pattern of multi-listing or Region-shopping noted above 
that favors NCNRtx patients and others who are able to make use of this strategy.   
 A more equitable approach to DDLT allocation—one which would indirectly discourage 
the donation of organs to NCNRtx patients—would be adoption of a Survival Benefit-Based 
Liver Allocation system such as that outlined by Keller, et al. in a recent paper.  Under this ap-
proach, beyond MELD scoring, patients would be assessed for such things as quality-adjusted 
life years and age (with higher quality organs going to younger wait-list candidates) (16).   
 Implicit in Keller’s proposal is an examination of which DDL match will maximize the 
use of the donor liver.  While Keller does not advocate for the adoption of “organ stewardship” 
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as a criteria for receipt of donor livers, his model sets the stage for such considerations by includ-
ing ethical criteria in the analysis of liver allocation.  Further, the authors suggest that the antici-
pated life of the liver should be factored into allocation determinations and specifically advocate 
for incorporation of post-transplant outcomes as a part of allocation determinations (16).   
 At present, OPTN does not maintain data on the individual countries from which 
NCNRtx patients originate.  Nevertheless, it can be surmised that a sizable portion of these indi-
viduals come from countries where there is notably inferior domestic transplant infrastructure 
(5), such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt (17), and Japan (18).  Assuming this to be accurate, it would be 
permissible under a Survival Benefit-Based Model to include considerations of the patient’s abil-
ity to adhere to accepted post-transplant care and treatment once they have returned to their 
home country.  This would include having access to appropriate medications and medical super-
vision, as well as physicians available to address post-operative or later complications (e.g. rejec-
tion, infection) that may arise after the individual has left the US.   
 To our knowledge, transplant programs currently have no systematic approach to as-
sessing post-transplant supervisory capacity or long-term outcomes for NCNRtx patients.  Where 
capacity for appropriate organ stewardship cannot be established, such patients should not be 
placed on the UNOS wait list, since their post-transplant outcomes can neither be surveilled nor 
assured.  This concern was echoed in the 2013 OPTN/UNOS International Relations Committee 
Report during which several committee members commented that assisting countries in develop-
ing their own domestic transplant programs is the “most compassionate way” to address 
NCNRtx patients in light of the fact they may not have adequate post-transplant care in their 
country of origin (1).  
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It is worth reflecting on whether justice is actually served by refusing transplants to pa-
tients of wealthy countries such as Japan whose cultural norms are in conflict with organ dona-
tion.  The Japanese opposition to organ donation stems from centuries old customs and practices 
that are incompatible with the comparatively new concept of “brain death” (18).  Notably, Japa-
nese funeral and “deathbed” customs cannot be adequately preserved if organs are procured from 
the body, irrespective of a declaration of brain death (18).  For people who reside in such coun-
tries, whether they share the prevailing beliefs or not, they must look to other countries for access 
to transplantation.     
Conversely, an injustice also occurs when the inclusion of NCNRtx patients as transplant 
candidates in the US dis-incentivizes the governments of foreign countries from establishing 
self-sustaining organ donation programs.  Moreover, those who may have the most influence and 
power, who are the most enfranchised, may opt out of activism in their countries of origin in fa-
vor of obtaining a transplant abroad.  Indeed, it was the result of “external pressures” (namely 
the recommendations put forth in the Declaration of Istanbul and by the World Health Organiza-
tion) that led Japan to recognize brain death as legal death and revise existing law to permit or-
gan donation by decedents who had not previously opted out and whose family’s consented to 
the donation (18). 
For the individuals of countries such as Japan or Egypt, who do not have the resources to 
travel to a country with advanced transplant infrastructure, there is no chance at all of obtaining a 
life-saving organ.  Their only opportunity for access to organ transplantation will result from 
“external pressures” placed on their governments by the larger international transplant commu-
nity. 
Reciprocity, Investment, and Participation 
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 Reciprocity in the context of DDLT suggests that an ethical allocation of livers would re-
flect the proportionate participation of the individual patient in the overall transplant infrastruc-
ture.  For US residents, this translates most obviously to an assumed investment and participation 
in the donor pool, tax base, or larger organ transplant infrastructure, something arguably lacking 
from NCNRtx patients.   
 Admittedly, the question of whether donor registration should determine one’s ability to 
subsequently receive a donated organ presents conflicts for US residents as many US residents 
are not registered organ donors themselves (19).  But the act of registering as a donor is not the 
only way US residents become organ donors and therefore should not be considered the only in-
dicator of reciprocity among US residents.  For example, the US allows the agent of a decedent 
to donate the organs of their deceased loved one so long as that decedent has not taken steps to 
expressly prohibit the use of their organs (20).  Further, individuals who wish to become donors 
and have not registered to do so may indicate their desire to be donors in a will or by making cer-
tain verbal or written statements before witnesses (20).   Although the US does not employ an 
opt-out framework, affirmative registration as a donor is a facilitator of organ donation, not a 
prerequisite and therefore, should not be unduly emphasized in evaluating the public’s participa-
tion in organ donation.   
 As a final matter, even those individuals who would oppose donation of their own organs 
indirectly support the US transplant infrastructure through taxes that fund Medicaid and Medi-
care and/or participation in insurance risk-pools that then provide coverage for others who re-
ceive organ transplantation.  While paying of taxes certainly does not always translate to feelings 
of good will towards government programs, it is nevertheless participation in the system on 
which such an individual may one day draw. 
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 Notwithstanding the indirect participation by US residents, more aggressive measures 
premised on reciprocity principles have been successfully implemented in other countries.  
Among such countries is Israel, which instituted policies in 2012 that prioritized registered organ 
donors ahead of those who had not registered in the event that individual subsequently required 
an organ transplant (21, 22).  These reforms have resulted in a significant increase in donor regis-
trations (22, 23).  Still, the success of these policies remains unclear as physicians have reported 
finding it difficult to overcome the wishes of a decedent’s family members who object to dona-
tion (22).  While similar measures could be used to improve donation rates in the US, some dis-
parity between organ supply and demand would certainly still remain and thus not resolve the 
critical question of how to prioritize NCNRtx patients.  
 The access given to NCNRtx patients highlights the additional ethical irony existing for 
unauthorized immigrants.  Unauthorized immigrants have long been barred from receiving a 
number of publicly-funded services, including publicly financed healthcare (i.e. Medicaid) (24).  
However, these individuals, who comprise 3.3% of deceased donors (7) (proportional to their 
overall presence in the US population) (25) are an indisputable part of the donor pool.  Further, 
they are active participants in the larger economy both as taxpayers and consumers.   
 Current US policy and law result in inclusion of a group of DDLT recipients with little to 
no potential for direct or indirect reciprocal participation in the US transplant infrastructure while 
excluding a group with actual, demonstrated participation.  It is important to carefully consider 
the extent to which this disparity respects issues of reciprocity and the equitable treatment of all 
groups. 
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To address the issue of individual reciprocity, some have argued for a system of organ 
allocation that embraces transnational reciprocity (4).  In one of the exceedingly few in-depth ex-
aminations of ethical conflicts implicated by NCNRtx patients, Cohen acknowledges the precise 
inherent unfairness we have discussed: allowing a group of persons to draw on a system into 
which they invest only minimally or not at all (4).  Cohen suggests this inequity could be re-cali-
brated if the US allowed for a more international approach to organ sharing in which US resi-
dents were listed as transplant candidates in those countries from which NCNRtx patients are 
traveling (4).   
Cohen acknowledges his concept is largely theoretical, but it raises interesting questions 
of what should count as “reciprocity” and whether true reciprocity is even possible.  Taking Co-
hen’s suggestion of an international transplant reciprocity, while advancements in transplant 
technology have extended the life of DDLs, as a matter of practical implementation, we are un-
likely to create such an international transplantation network (26).  Transplant medicine is not 
yet at a stage where DDLs could make a trans-Atlantic journey without significant risk to the vi-
ability of the organ, and therefore to the overall success of the transplant.  Rather, the possibility 
that organs could be shared nationally throughout the US is just beginning to be explored (14, 
26). 
More compelling is the potential for reciprocity with those very small, poor countries that 
rely on the US to provide tertiary care.  These patients do have at least the potential to serve as 
organ donors in the US.  This would seem to satisfy the reciprocal element missing for many 
other NCNRtx patients.  Unfortunately, the very thing that brings them to the US for medical 
care (their own small, impoverished country) may hinder their ability to establish access to ap-
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propriate post-transplant care.  If so, they would be unable to adequately satisfy their ethical obli-
gation of organ stewardship.  When examined closely, it seems there is no avenue for entirely 
avoiding the ethical obstacles implicit in allocating an absolutely scarce, life-saving liver to an 
NCNRtx patient.   
A Potential for Donor Deterrence 
 The most effective way to improve organ transplant rates is to increase the rate of volun-
tary organ donation.  However, the task of encouraging individuals to register as donors or will-
ingly donate the organs of a deceased loved one has proven challenging.  Extensive debates have 
swirled around increasing the incentives to potential donors through wide-ranging possibilities 
from monetary compensation (27, 28), to analogizing donors to firefighters and police officers 
(29).  Conversely, events which undermine public perceptions of fairness and trust in the trans-
plant system clearly can have a negative impact on willingness to donate  (30). This public trust 
is thus a bedrock on which the entire transplant system rests.   
 There is very little research on whether the public is aware that NCNRtx patients are in-
cluded in our organ allocation system or what effect their inclusion would have on the public’s 
willingness to donate organs.  In the only survey of which we are aware that attempted to quan-
tify public attitudes about NCNRtx patients, nearly one-third of respondents indicated that peo-
ple should not be allowed to travel to the US for the express purpose of receiving a transplant 
(31).  An additional 28% of respondents indicated the practice should be limited to several select 
circumstances such as that no US resident could use the organ (exactly the approach endorsed in 
this paper) or that the transplant was being performed on a NCNR child (31).  Importantly, of 
those individuals who would be willing to donate their own organs, 33% responded they would 
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or might be less likely to donate if they knew those organs were available to people coming from 
other countries (31).  
Although it seems unlikely the public is aware that NCNRtx patients regularly receive 
organs in US transplant programs, knowledge of the practice might have a negative effect on do-
nation rates.  Additionally, it is possible that anti-foreigner sentiments, which are relatively com-
mon in the US (32), may exacerbate any such effect.   
Legal and Policy Considerations 
Present OPTN policies regarding care to NCNR patients were drafted to avoiding inad-
vertently waging into political waters and ensure that organs were allocated to the sickest pa-
tients. Recent discussions regarding policy revisions and the examination of NCNR patients have 
cautioned that politics should be put aside when considering this issue with focus instead on pre-
senting data that can be easily catalogued and considered (1).  Therefore, OPTN policies and US 
law are not only blind to questions of citizenship and residency, they expressly prohibit such 
considerations in making determinations of allocation.   
The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) section 371 (b)(2)(E) sates that the 
Organ Procurement Organizations established pursuant to NOTA’s authority shall “have a sys-
tem to allocate donated organs among transplant centers and patients according to established 
medical criteria” (13).  Additionally, OPTN Policy 5.4.A expressly forbids the consideration of 
either citizenship or residency status (2).  In doing so, the policies and law avoid the political 
minefields of whether to provide access to unauthorized immigrants and whether certain coun-
tries that Americans may view unfavorably should be excluded while other countries are pro-
vided continued access.  Further, the policies allow individual transplant centers to independently 
decide whether to accept such patients when deciding whether to list them.  In short, the policies 
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encourage autonomy of transplant centers and fairness to patients in the form of equal allocation 
criteria for any individual wait-listed. 
 However, the movement towards international collaboration on transplant policies, the 
worsening of the organ supply-demand gulf in the US (12), and emerging data regarding the con-
nection between socioeconomic status and access to transplantation suggest the implementation 
of these policies, particularly within the DDLT scenario, does not always result in fairness and 
conflicts with international policy.  The World Health Organization’s Guiding Principles on Hu-
man Cell, Tissue & Organ Transplantation makes explicitly clear that excessive fees and finan-
cial considerations should have no effect on allocation of organs (33).  The Declaration of Istan-
bul, which has been endorsed in the US by UNOS’s Board of Directors (34), prioritizes self-suf-
ficiency and states “treatment of patients from outside the country or jurisdiction is only accepta-
ble if it does not undermine a country’s ability to provide transplant services for its own popula-
tion.” (35).   
 The pattern and practice of socioeconomically advantaged patients traveling to the US or 
other First World countries to obtain organs is uniformly frowned on by the international trans-
plant community, but is indirectly permitted under US policy and law.  It is our position that US 
policy should be revised to align with international norms, particularly where those norms further 
clearly stated ethical goals such as establishing “self-sufficiency” of organ programs and dis-
couraging potential for exploitative use of organs for financial gain.   
 
Discussion and Recommendations 
 We wish to acknowledge several of the most compelling arguments against our position: 
the view that all human beings deserve equal opportunities for life saving treatments irrespective 
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of artificial boundaries such as geography (a human rights viewpoint); the position that trans-
plants among NCNRtx patients attract funds that might be used for other purposes within trans-
plant programs, such as innovation and research; education and awareness aimed at increasing 
the rate of organ donation; or to subsidize un- or underfunded patients.  We are compelled by 
each of these arguments.  However, in the context of the US transplant system, where literally 
thousands of US residents die each year waiting for livers, with no dramatic change in the supply 
of organs anywhere on the near horizon, we currently cannot provide enough DDLs even for 
those patients already here, to whom we believe we owe our first obligation.   
 Consequently, and for the reasons outlined above, it is our position NCNRtx patients on 
the UNOS liver transplant wait list should be reserved to a last-in-line status whereby they may 
receive a deceased donor liver only to the extent the liver is not acceptable to a US resident (citi-
zen or not) on the list.  It is further our position that NOTA and Rule 5.4.A should be repealed or 
amended, since they, in connection with the newly promulgated Rule 17, not only allow for, but 
expressly prescribe that NCNRtx patients be accorded equal treatment with residents in organ 
allocation.  Additional revisions to the existing DDLT system of allocation - including the con-
sideration of survival-benefit criteria and movement towards national organ sharing - should also 
be implemented.   
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